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USAF. Born in San Antonio, TX, White graduated from West 
Point and flew aboard Gemini 4, becoming the first American 
astronaut to perform a spacewalk on June 3, 1965. As senior 
pilot aboard Apollo 1, White was seated in the center and was 
responsible for opening the main hatch if the crew had to make 
an emergency egress from the cockpit. Rounding out the crew 
of Apollo 1 was 31-year-old Grand Rapids, MI, native and pilot 
Roger B. Chaffee, Lieutenant Commander, USN. Like Gris-
som, Chaffee was a graduate of Purdue University, earning his 
bachelor’s of aeronautical engineering in 1957. As one of the 
youngest astronauts selected by NASA, Chaffee was to take his 
first flight into space on Apollo 1. During the flight rehearsal, 
he was seated in the right-most seat and charged with main-
taining communications with ground controllers in the event 
of an emergency. Additional biographical information on the 
astronauts can be found in our supplemental material (see the 
online appendix for details).2, 3
“Go fever!”
To meet President Kennedy’s challenge of landing a man 
on the Moon before 1970, NASA had to develop an unprec-
edented amount of flight hardware, training protocols, and 
mission procedures in just a few short years. In this high-
stakes, high-risk atmosphere, the U.S. space industry devel-
oped what is commonly referred to today as “go fever”—a 
group-think phenomenon in which people push themselves, 
despite great danger, to meet a previously chosen goal. Unfor-
tunately, “go fever” was causing concern for the primary and 
backup crews of Apollo 1. For example, during a spacecraft 
review meeting held on August 19, 1966, the astronauts ex-
pressed worry about having so much flammable VELCRO® 
inside the cabin.4 Despite these concerns, engineers kept the 
flammable material in the capsule to facilitate the securing of 
tools and equipment. Engineers marched forward with their 
planned Feb. 21 launch. 
Cape Kennedy Air Force Station Launch Complex 34A 
was the site for the “Plugs Out Integrated Test” of the AS-204 
spacecraft on Jan. 27, 1967. The “plugs out” moniker describes 
a test of the vehicle to see how it performs under internal 
power, with no umbilicals supplying off-board power to the 
ship. The rehearsal was dubbed “non-hazardous” since no 
pyrotechnic systems were armed nor was the rocket fueled. At 
1:00 p.m., the crew climbed into the capsule and was strapped 
into their seats. Grissom immediately reported a foul odor of 
“sour buttermilk” circulating through his suit. The simulated 
countdown was suspended at 1:20 p.m. and resumed at 2:42 
p.m. when engineers could not identify a cause of the odor. 
At this point, the complicated three-layered hatch was closed. 
The air in the cockpit was then replaced by pure oxygen, pres-
surized to 16.7 psi, to drive out any air that entered the cockpit 
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This January marked the 52nd anniversary of the Apollo 1 fire. On Jan. 27, 1967, the interior of NASA’s AS-204 command module (CM), occupied by American as-
tronauts Roger Chaffee, Virgil “Gus” Grissom, and Ed White, 
caught fire during a rehearsal of its scheduled Feb. 21 launch 
(Fig. 1). By the time the ground crew was able to open the 
hatch, the three astronauts had perished. On April 24, 1967, 
NASA announced that the flight would be officially re-desig-
nated “Apollo 1.” In this case study, we conduct a basic hori-
zontal flame test, patterned after the protocols set forth by the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to measure the ig-
nitability of solids. The laboratory activity is a complementary 
exercise to the vertical flame test described in our previous 
article that examined the initial source of fuel for the fire that 
destroyed the massive German zeppelin Hindenburg in 1937.1  
Combining techniques from both case studies gives students 
a quantitative understanding of how the flammability of ma-
terials is tested and how a forensics approach to physics can be 
used to understand significant historical events.
Commanding the first manned Apollo mission was 
40-year-old veteran astronaut, Virgil I. Grissom, Lieutenant 
Colonel, USAF. A native of Mitchell, IN, and 1950 graduate of 
Purdue University’s mechanical engineering program, Gris-
som was one of NASA’s original class of astronauts—the famed 
“Mercury 7 Astronauts.” Preferring to be called “Gus,” Grissom 
previously commanded the second suborbital Mercury flight 
as well as the first manned Gemini mission. As the command 
pilot aboard Apollo 1, Grissom was seated in the left-most 
seat (facing the cockpit dash) and had access to the emergen-
cy cabin pressure relief valve, to be opened in the event of a 
cabin fire. The senior pilot aboard Apollo 1 was another space 
veteran, 36-year-old Edward H. White II, Lieutenant Colonel, 
Fig. 1. The primary crew of Apollo 1.  Left to right: 
Edward H. White II (Lt. Col., USAF – Senior Pilot), 
Virgil I. “Gus” Grissom (Lt. Col., USAF – Command 
Pilot), and Roger B. Chaffee (Lt. Cdr., USN – Pilot). 
(Photo courtesy of NASA) 
By roughly 6:36 p.m., ground controllers opened the hatch 
—only five minutes had elapsed since the first report of a 
fire. Smoke and lethal gases from the fire had asphyxiated the 
astronauts. The nylon outer covering of the astronauts’ space 
suits and life-support hoses were melted and their bodies were 
fused to the interior of the cockpit. Seven and a half hours 
after the fire, the bodies were removed. Autopsies confirmed 
that all three crewmen died from carbon monoxide poison-
ing, resulting in cerebral hypoxia and cardiac arrest. Burns 
suffered by the crew were not believed to have contributed 
to their deaths as they occurred postmortem. Details of the 
fire are provided in our supplemental material (see the online 
appendix for details).2,3 Finally, a number of multimedia re-
sources are available to portray events to students in the class-
room. For example, the episode “Apollo 1,” from the 12-part 
1998 HBO docudrama miniseries “From the Earth to the 
Moon,” does a fantastic job dramatizing the Apollo 1 tragedy 
and the ensuing Congressional investigation. There is another 
scene, “This is what we did instead of sleep,” that exemplifies 
the fast-paced “go fever” mindset that plagued the mission.6,7
Apollo 1 in the physics laboratory
In our prior work, we investigated how fabrics burn verti-
cally after the source of ignition is removed. The activity was 
modeled after ASTM D 6413-99—The Standard Test Method 
for Flame Resistance of Textiles (Vertical Test), which has 
been adopted as an accepted Federal Test Standard.1,8 We now 
add a horizontal flame test to our repertoire of laboratory 
activities. This test is modeled after EPA Method 1030—Ig-
nitability of Solids.9Although the method is used primarily 
to test pastes, granular materials, and powdery substances, it 
works on any solid material that can be cut into strips. Since 
the procedures for the vertical flame test were already de-
scribed in our previous publication, we now describe only the 
procedures for the horizontal flame test yet report results for 
both orientations.1 Also, since English units are used in the 
ASTM protocols, we also use English units in our analysis. 
The equipment and materials needed to run this activity cost 
under $30 and were readily obtained from local hardware and 
as the crew boarded as well as to seal the plug door. Such a 
door seals itself by taking advantage of a pressure difference 
established across its two sides. As the cabin is pressurized, a 
wedge-shaped door is forced into a socket, forming a seal that 
prevents it from being opened until the cabin pressure can be 
released. Most commercial aircraft in service today use a plug 
door design. The decision to use a pure oxygen environment, 
over a duel-gas nitrogen-oxygen system, makes sense for sev-
eral reasons: it is simpler to design, weighs less, and eliminates 
the possibility of decompression sickness (i.e., “the bends”). 
Once the capsule was in space during an actual flight, the 
pure oxygen atmosphere would have been lowered to 5 psi to 
reduce the risk of fire while still sealing the hatch against the 
almost zero pressure of space.
“We’ve got a fire in the cockpit”
Problems plagued Apollo 1 all afternoon, most of them 
involving the communications system. The countdown was 
suspended again at 5:40 p.m. while engineers tried to debug 
the problems. At 6:30 p.m., the countdown remained on hold. 
Grissom’s microphone was stuck on (recording the audio 
used to determine what happened) and controllers heard him 
question: “How are we going to get to the Moon if we can’t talk 
between two or three buildings?” In the midst of all of this “go 
fever,” something was about to “go” terribly wrong. 
The Apollo 204 Review Board’s reconstruction of events 
estimates the fire to have progressed as follows: At exactly 
6:30:55 p.m., engineers detected a power surge that accom-
panied an electrical short, probably sparked by a chafed wire, 
somewhere in the lower left side of the CM near the environ-
mental control unit below Grissom’s seat. The Apollo 1 fire 
now had its ignition source. The initial source of fuel for the 
fire was the polyethylene tubing that covered the wires run-
ning throughout the capsule. Several large patches of adhesive 
VELCRO hooks that were attached to the wall panels of the 
CM, leg-rests, and seats were the next materials to ignite. 
Eventually, the fire reached the astronauts. At 6:31:04 p.m., 
a crew member (an audio analysis is inconclusive as to the 
identity) shouted: “Hey!” or “Fire!” At 6:31:06 p.m., Chaffee 
reported: “We’ve got a fire in the cockpit.” White struggled 
to open the main hatch while Grissom, blocked by a wall of 
flames, tried to reach the emergency cabin pressure vent valve. 
To prevent the hatch from accidentally opening upon splash-
down, the hatch had been redesigned with no explosive bolts 
to blow it open. As the fire burned, pressure inside the cabin 
increased, sealing the plug door tighter and tighter. At 6:31:13 
p.m., a badly garbled voice (believed to be White’s) shouted: 
“We’ve got a bad fire. … Let’s get out … .We’re burning up,” 
followed by a prolonged scream of pain.5 At 6:31:19 p.m., the 
interior pressure reached 29 psi and burst the inner wall of the 
CM, allowing ambient air into the cabin. All transmissions 
of voice and data from the spacecraft terminated by 6:31:22, 
three seconds after the CM’s inner wall burst. A secondary fire 
broke out as flammable materials inside the cabin (i.e., poly-
ethylene tubing, VELCRO netting, nylon suits, etc.) burned 
(Fig. 2). 
Fig. 2. The badly charred interior of the AS-204 
Command Module in the aftermath of the fire. (Photo 
courtesy of NASA).3
to observe, sputtering can be especially problematic during the 
vertical flame test, so be sure that the students completely close 
the window to the safety hood once they remove the flame 
from the sample. Students filmed each trial using cell phone 
cameras in slow-motion mode. Once the flame was removed, 
students continued to film the strip until any visual flame or 
glow self-extinguished [Fig. 3(b), (c), and (d)]. These videos 
are used to determine the duration of time, to 0.1-s resolu-
tion, that the samples needed to burn across the 4-in distance 
marked by the permanent lines on the ceramic plate. Any signs 
of melting, dripping, or sputtering were noted. 
As students conduct their trials, the propagation of flames, 
accompanied by the sputtering, dripping, and melting of 
fabrics and tubing, is striking to see. Even in the absence of 
a pressurized oxygen environment, students dramatically 
observe the highly dangerous conditions that must have con-
sumed the interior of the Apollo 1 cockpit! Table I shows data 
from a typical run of our activity. Data from the horizontal 
flame tests indicate that without the pressurized oxygen envi-
ronment, a fire consuming pure polyethylene or VELCRO as 
its fuel would need 40 to 90 min to travel a distance equal to 
the diameter of the CM. In the case of the vertical flame tests, 
such a fire would need 15 to 25 min to propagate a distance 
equal to the height of the CM. Thus, regardless of orientation, 
the samples do not burn at fast enough rates to consume a 
ship the size of an Apollo CM in the timeframe observed 
during the Apollo 1 fire (i.e., half a minute). Students in our 
cohort quickly realized that the atmospheric burn rates of 
these materials are much slower than those observed inside 
the capsule, demonstrating that the pressurized pure oxygen 
environment dramatically changed the flammability of the in-
terior fabrics and was critical to the rapid spread of the fire in-
side the capsule. In fact, literature indicates that polyethylene 
and VELCRO burn over twice as fast in oxygen at a pressure 
of 16.5 psi than at 5 psi. Therefore, before the inner wall of 
the CM ruptured, the primary fuels for the fire burned more 
than twice as fast as they did under the conditions for which 
they were evaluated.10 Even more incredibly, transcripts from 
fabric stores. We piloted our activity on a cohort of under-
graduate students.
• Sample preparation: We purchased a ceramic plate 
(24 in36 in35/16 in) at a local hardware store. Using a per-
manent marker, we drew two lines, 4.0 in apart, centered 
on the plate. The burn rate of samples would be measured 
between these two lines. Several combustible materials were 
factors in the Apollo 1 fire; however, polyethylene tubing 
and VELCRO (both hook and loop sides) were the primary 
culprits and thus formed the basis of our laboratory exercise. 
We made no attempt to purchase fabrics or tubing with the 
exact specifications of those aboard Apollo 1. Instead, we 
chose to test the readily available modern-day versions of 
these materials. We are aware that the materials manufactured 
today are different from those aboard Apollo 1, especially 
since flame-retardant technologies have dramatically evolved 
over the last 50 years. With this in mind, we next purchased 
polyethylene wire covering that we rolled flat and swatches 
of VELCRO hooks and loops that we ironed flat. These three 
materials were then distributed to students who trimmed 
them into five 12-in-3-3-in strips and weighed each strip 
(the weight of each sample is only needed for the vertical burn 
test). Each strip was placed into a frame of sheet metal that 
secured the strip on its two long sides, leaving its two short 
edges exposed. The strips were clamped to the frame at four 
locations with simple binder clips. Using this sample prepa-
ration technique allows students to test samples in either the 
horizontal or vertical orientations.
• Testing and results: We placed the ceramic plate on the 
floor of a safety hood. We then set the metal frame 1 in over 
the center of the plate by balancing the corners of the frame 
on stacks of 2-in-3-2-in ceramic tiles [Fig. 3(a)]. We orient-
ed the long axis of the frame perpendicular to the airflow 
of the safety hood, which was held at 0.7 to 1 m/s, and took 
precautions to minimize drafts in the hood. To enhance the 
filming of flames, we dimmed the lights and placed a black 
poster inside the hood to serve as a background. We made 
no attempt to control ambient temperature nor to create an 
oxygen-rich pressured atmosphere. Each of the three samples 
was tested five times and the average was reported per sample. 
In agreement with the literature, our burn rates were repeat-
able to within 10%.9 A Bunsen burner, with 10-mm inside 
diameter barrel, was used to create a 1.5-in high, 99%-pure 
methane flame. The burner could be swiveled so that the tip of 
the flame was brought to the exposed edge of the sample. The 
flame was applied for 12 ± 0.5 s (flame to strip), as measured 
by a stopwatch. Note that EPA Method 1030 (horizontal flame 
test) recommends that the flame be applied for 2 min, while 
ASTM D 6413-99 (vertical flame test) recommends that the 
flame be applied for only 12 s. In order to present students 
with a uniform testing procedure, we adopted the 12-s appli-
cation for both types of test. Also, beware that many synthetic 
materials are prone to “sputtering”—a phenomenon whereby 
burning particles of fabric are sporadically ejected several 
inches from the propagating flame front. Although fascinating 
Fig. 3. Our apparatus for horizontal flame testing. (a) Start of 
test. (b) A flame front crosses the beginning of the 4-in test-
ing zone. (c) A flame front propagates across the 4-in testing 
zone. (d) A flame front crosses the end of the 4-in testing zone.
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
a Senate hearing indicate that 
the polyethylene and VEL-
CRO inside Apollo 1 may have 
even burned at a rate of 2.5 
in/s, which would have indeed 
consumed a ship the size of an 
Apollo CM in under a min-
ute.11  In short, the pressurized 
oxygen atmosphere made 
almost every material inside 
the cabin, even materials not 
normally considered highly 
flammable, prone to burst into 
flames when given a spark. Fi-
nally, we discuss with students 
that three phenomena would 
have increased the spread 
rate of the fire in the capsule over that measured in small 
scale propagation studies similar to our laboratory activities: 
convection currents generated by the fire itself; dripping of 
burning materials resulting in a liquefied molten stream that 
spreads the fire; and sputtering of burning materials that proj-
ects burning particles several inches from their origin. 
Conclusions
A compelling case can be made for bringing the anniversa-
ry of the Apollo 1 fire into the introductory physics classroom. 
First, the physics of flammability can be treated appropriately 
at the introductory level since only careful measurements of 
time, distance, and weight are needed. Second, the case study 
is interdisciplinary. While we piloted this case study in a sci-
ence education class, it may also be useful in introductory 
engineering classes, senior engineering ethics classes, and 
fiber science classes. The fire can even serve as the basis of a 
senior-level capstone project. Next, the resulting analysis pro-
vides instructors with several “teachable moments”—it brings 
real-world applications of physics to the classroom; it shows 
how standardized testing protocols are used; and it demon-
strates to students (perhaps for the first time) the field of fail-
ure analysis and how a cascade of unlikely events can result in 
an unpredictable catastrophe. Indeed, far from being a set of 
agreed upon immutable facts, the historical record is a living, 
changing thing and is open to revisitation, reexamination, 
and reinterpretation. However, an interview conducted by 
Gus Grissom a few weeks before his death provides perhaps 
the best reason for sharing this case study with our students. 
During the interview, Grissom was asked about the dangers 
of spaceflight. He replied: “If we die, we want people to ac-
cept it. We’re in a risky business, and we hope that if anything 
happens to us it will not delay the program. The conquest of 
space is worth the risk of life.”13 Thus, bringing the Apollo 1 
fire to the introductory physics classroom uniquely raises the 
historical awareness of our students by vividly portraying the 
heroic efforts of those individuals involved in the early days of 
the exploration of space.
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Horizontal orientation Vertical orientation
Burn 
time
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4-in
path)
Burn 
rate
Burn 
time*
Burn 
time*
  lbs/in2 s in/s min s s in in/s min
VELCRO (Hook) 1.13 Yes Yes 66 0.06 41.4 89 120 12 0.14 16.5
VELCRO (Loop) 1.10 Yes Yes 79 0.05 49.5 78 139 12 0.15 14.5
Polyethylene 1.31 Yes Yes 140 0.03 87.8 133 190 12 0.09 24.7
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Table I. Horizontal and vertical flame test results.
*Burn times were extrapolated to the appropriate dimensions of the Apollo CM—a conically shaped capsule that was 11 ft, 1.5 in
high; 12 ft, 6.5 in in diameter; and had approximately 210 ft3 of habitable space.12 
†These terms were described in our prior work.1
